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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule
3, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and Section 78-2-2, Utah Code
Annotated 1953.

Plaintiff and Respondent Bud Leach ("Leach"), commenced this
action to recover the amount due him under a promissory note (the
"Leach Note") signed by Weldon L. Daines ("Daines"), J. R. Willyard
("Willyard") and Sheldon Player ("Player").

Liability for the note

was expressly assumed by Appellant, Kenneth K. Knight ("Knight").
Knight filed a second action, civil no. 87-7445, contending he had
been fraudulently induced by Daines to assume the Leach Note and
was entitled to rescind the agreement.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The following issues are presented for review on Knight's
appeal of the Judgment in favor of Leach:
1.

Is Knight entitled to raise for the first time in his

Brief the claim that the district court erred in instructing the
jury that Knight was required to commence this action within three
years

after

Knight

discovered,

or

through

the

exercise

of

reasonable care, should have discovered, the fraud or his claim was
barred by the statute of limitations?
2.

If Knight is entitled to raise this claim for the first

time in his Brief, was the instruction described in paragraph 1
above incorrect?
3.

In any event, did the statute of limitations instruction

constitute prejudicial error in view of the fact that the jury
determined that Knight had not been defrauded?
4.

Was Knight entitled to rescind his agreement to pay the

Leach Note in view of the fact that Knight had sold 41% of his
interest in the hotel so he could not restore the parties to the
2

status quo?
Is Leach entitled to recover attorneys1 fees incurred on

5.

this appeal?
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

Leach commenced this action seeking to recover the amount due
him on the Leach Note executed by Daines, Player and Willyard on
June 10, 1980. Recovery was sought from Knight on the basis that
he had expressly assumed liability for payment of the Leach Note
by virtue of an agreement dated November 15, 1983.

Approximately

a year and a half after Leach filed the original Complaint in this
case and shortly after Knight had obtained a continuance of the
original trial date, Knight filed a second action, civil no. 877445, against Daines, Willyard, Player and Leach, contending that
he had been defrauded by Daines into assuming the obligation owed
to Leach on the Leach Note, and was therefore entitled to rescind
that agreement. The cases were consolidated.

After the trial was

continued a second time for several months at the request of
Knight, the case finally went to trial before a jury on August 22,
1988.
Player and Willyard did not appear at trial, and Default
Judgments were entered in favor of Leach. Also, a Directed Verdict
was entered in favor of Leach against Daines on the Leach Note.
After

a

four

day

jury

trial,

the

jury

answered

special

interrogatories in which it determined that Knight had not been
defrauded into agreeing to assume all liability to Leach on the
3

promissory note.

Judgment was thereafter entered on October 11,

1988, in favor of Leach on the promissory note against Knight,
Daines, Player and Willyard in the sum of $227,939.53.

It is from

this judgment that Knight appeals.
B.

Statement of Facts.

On June 10, 1980, Daines, Willyard and Player signed the Leach
Note

in the amount of $274,222.50.

Leach had previously

had

discussions with Daines about becoming a partner with Daines,
Willyard

and

Player

in

the

Rock

Springs

constructed in Rock Springs, Wyoming.

Hilton

Hotel

being

Leach advanced money with

respect to the development of the hotel.

When he did not become

a partner, his advances got converted to the Leach Note.

[R.

Tr.Vol. 1, pp. 31-35; 44-47; Ex. 1]
The Leach Note was payable in monthly payments of $5,000.00.
The payments were made on a timely basis for over three years. [R.
Tr.Vol. 1, pp. 28-29; 48; Ex. 3]

In November 1983, Knight entered

into agreements with Willyard, Player and Daines, pursuant to which
Knight acquired the controlling interest in the hotel and took over
management of the hotel.

In connection with these agreements,

Knight expressly agreed to assume and pay the obligation owing to
Leach on the Leach Note.

[R. Tr.Vol 1, pp. 48-51; Ex. 6]

Only one $5,000.00 payment was made on the Leach Note after
Knight assumed the obligation to pay it.

[R. Tr.Vol 3, p. 74]

Thereafter, during early and mid-1984, Knight informed

Leach's

counsel that the hotel was having trouble and he was unable to make
the $5,000.00 payments, but that he would make monthly interest
4

only payments while he was trying to turn the hotel around.
Tr.Vol. 3, p. 75]

[R.

Knight did, in fact, make monthly interest only

payments of approximately $1,638.00 per month covering a period of
approximately two years.

Knight made no claim during this period

of time that he had been defrauded or wasn't liable on the Leach
Note.

In fact, during late 1984, Knight tried to persuade Leach

to take an interest in the hotel in lieu of the amount owing on the
Leach Note and represented to Leach the hotel was making thousands
of dollars each month.

In fact, the hotel was not doing well.

Knight eventually stopped making payments in early 1986, solely
because the hotel didn't have the money, and this lawsuit was
filed.

[R. Tr.Vol. 3,pp. 81-83; 86-91; Exs. 3, 10, 11. 12 and 47]

Some months after the lawsuit was filed, Knight contended for
the first time that he was not liable to pay the Leach Note because
he

had

been

defrauded

by

Daines

into

assuming

liability

by

misrepresentations by Daines concerning the financial condition of
the Rock Springs Hotel.

[R. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 81-83]

Leach denied that Knight had been defrauded or that he was
entitled to rescind his agreement to pay the Leach Note.
further

contended

that

Leachfs

fraud

claim

and

Leach

request

for

rescission was barred because it had not been filed within three
years after the fraud was discovered or should have been
discovered,

and that, in any event, Knight could

not

rescind

because he had not acted promptly to do so after he knew or should
have known of the alleged fraud.
The jury determined, in response to special interrogatory no.
5

1, that Leach had not been defrauded.

[R. Tr.Vol. 4, p. 165]

The

jury did not reach the question posed by special interrogatory 4
as

to

when

Knight

discovered,

or,

through

the

exercise

reasonable care, should have discovered, the alleged
Daines.

of

fraud of

Nor did the jury reach the question posed by interrogatory

no. 3 as to whether Knight was entitled to rescind the agreement
by which he agreed to pay the obligation owed to Leach on the
promissory note.
IV.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Knight is not entitled to raise for the first time in his

Brief the issue of whether the instruction concerning the statute
of limitations given by the court that Knight was required to
commence an action on the claimed fraud within three years after
he discovered or should have discovered the alleged
correct.
applied

Knight's
to

a

arguments that the Utah

resident

of

Montana

and

fraud was

statute cannot be

that

the

statute

of

limitations did not accrue against Leach because Knight was never
a resident of the state of Utah, were not raised below or in the
Docketing Statement, and cannot be raised for the first time in
Knight's Brief.
2.

Even if Knight is entitled to raise the issue concerning

the statute of limitations instruction, the court's instruction was
correct.

A court will generally apply the forum's statutes of

limitations.

The fact that Knight was not a resident of the State

of Utah did not serve to toll the statute, nor did Knight request
an instruction on tolling.
6

3.

Even if it is assumed for the purposes of argument that

the court committed error in giving the instruction concerning the
statute of limitations, that error was not prejudicial as the jury
determined that Knight had not been defrauded.

The jury did not

determine one way or another whether the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations.
4.

Regardless of any other fact, Knight could not escape

liability on the Leach Note because Knight was not entitled to
rescind his agreement to pay that Note. Knight had transferred 41%
of his interest in the hotel so he could not restore the parties
to the status quo.
5.

Leach is entitled to recover his attorneys1 fees incurred

on appeal as attorneys1 fees are provided for in the Leach Note.
V.
1.

ARGUMENT

Knight Cannot Raise the Statute of Limitation Issue for

the First Time in His Brief.
On page 8 of his Docketing Statement filed on this appeal,
Knight set forth his only claim on appeal with respect to the Leach
Judgment:
It was error for the Court to instruct the jury that
"Knight was not required to rescind before he became
reasonably certain of the fraud or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known of the fraud."
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Knight
takes exception to the underlined provision above.
The complained of instruction related to Leach's claim that Knight
could not rescind because he had not elected to do so promptly
after learning of the alleged fraud.

7

Knight has now abandoned this

claim.

Knight did not raise as an issue in the Docketing Statement

whether

the

instruction

concerning

instruction was proper.

the statute

of

limitations

Further, Knight did not contend below, as

he now does, that the Utah statute of limitations didn't apply or
that the statute was tolled.

Rather, Knight only complained about

the statute of limitations instruction on the basis that the court
should not have instructed that the statute began to run when
Knight should, with reasonable care, have discovered the fraud.
[R. Tr.Vol. 4, p. 163]

Knight is precluded from making these new

claims for the first time in his Brief.

Franklin Financial v. New

Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).
2.

The

Court's

Instruction

Concerning

the

Statute

of

Limitations Was Correct.
The court instructed the jury that:
A party claiming to have been defrauded must file
a lawsuit within three years after he discovered or
through the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered, the fraud or his claim is barred by the statute
of limitations.
[Instruction no. 27; R. 535]
Knight wrongly claims this instruction was improper because
the Utah statute of limitations should not be applied and because
the statute was supposedly tolled as Knight was never a resident
of Utah.

These arguments are without any merit.

First, the district court properly applied the Utah statute
of limitations for fraud.
limitation

is

limitations.

involved,

Where, as here, a general statute of
courts

apply

the

forum's

statute

of

See, e.g. , Sobo v. Sobo, 626 P.2d 520, 521 (Wash.
8

1981); Eschenhagen v. Zika. 696 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Ariz. 1985); Green
v. Kensinger, 429 P.2d 95 (Kan. 1967); 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of
Actions Sec. 66. This rule is especially applicable in the present
case since Knight never requested the trial court to apply the
statute of limitations of any other state.
Second, the fact that Knight was never a resident of the state
of Utah does not operate to toll the statute of limitations. Utah
Code Annot., Sec. 78-12-35, upon which Knight relies, only provides
that if a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out
of the state, the statute of limitations does not commence to run
until after his return to the state, or, if a person leaves the
state after the statute of limitations commences running, the
statute is tolled during his absence from the state. The fact that
Knight, the person making the claim, was not a resident of Utah,
is not a basis for tolling the statute. Nor did Knight request an
instruction on tolling.
3.

Even if the Statute of Limitations Instruction Was

Erroneous, it Did Not Constitute Prejudicial Error.
Even if, contrary to what is argued above, the court erred in
giving

the

instruction

on the

statute

of

limitations, that

instruction did not constitute prejudicial error. The simple fact
of the matter is that neither the court nor the jury determined
that Knight's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Rather, the jury determined that Knight had not been defrauded.
Question No.l of the Special Verdict form given to the jury asked:
Did Daines induce Knight to sign the November 15,
1983 Memorandum of Understanding Agreement to pay the
9

obligation owing to Leach on the promissory note through
fraud? [R. Tr.Vol.4, p. 165]
The jury answered this question, "no".

Because the jury answered

question 1 in the negative, it was not required

to answer question

3 inquiring whether Knight was entitled to rescind the Memorandum
of

Understanding

limitations.
of

or

question

4

dealing

with

was

not prejudicial, and

does

constitute a basis for reversing the judgment.
739

statute

of

Accordingly, any instruction concerning the statute

limitations

Fereday,

the

P.2d

618

(Utah

1987);

not, therefore,

See, e.g., King v.

Larsen v.

Breitling

Bros.

Constr. Co. , 486 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1978); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d
170 (Utah 1983) .
For example, in King v. Fereday, supra, plaintiff complained
that the trial court had refused to give an instruction concerning
damages in a negligence action.

In affirming the verdict in favor

of the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court observed:
We do not, however, consider the propriety of the
trial court's ruling because any error in the refusal to
give the instruction was harmless.
This Court "may
reverse a trial court judgment only if there is a
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would
have been a result more favorable to the complaining
party."
[citations omitted]
As we have already
discussed, the jury found defendant not negligent. The
requested and refused instruction went to the issue of
damages. Because the jury found a lack of negligence as
to defendant, the issue of damages became irrelevant.
Thus, the failure to give the requested instruction, if
error, was harmless. [739 P.2d at 622]
In the present case, the jury determined that Knight had not
been defrauded.

Therefore, the issue of whether the fraud claim

was barred by the statute of limitations became irrelevant.
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4.

Knight Was Not Entitled to Rescind the Agreement to Pay

the Leach Note,
Knight's sole claim that he was not required to pay the Leach
Note was that he was entitled to rescind his agreement to pay that
Note because Daines had induced him by fraud to sign the agreement
to pay the Leach Note.

The jury determined based upon very

compelling evidence that Knight had not been defrauded and it was
clear that Knight's claim of fraud was simply a belated effort to
escape liability for payment of the Leach Note.

However, even if

it is assumed that Knight was defrauded, that his claim was not
barred by the statute of limitations and that he had otherwise
acted timely in giving notice of his intent to rescind, Knight
would still be barred from rescission. By Knight's own testimony,
Knight sold a 41% interest in the hotel to Technico Associates and
Cascade Mall, who were not parties to the lawsuit.

[R. Tr.Vol. 3,

p. 23] Because Knight could not return the interest in the hotel
which he received in consideration for his agreement to pay the
Leach Note, Knight was not entitled to rescind that Note. Simpson,
Handbook of the Law of Contracts, Sec. 201, p. 408 (2d Ed. 1965).
Therefore, whether or not the statute of limitations instruction
was correct, Knight could not escape liability on the Leach Note
and any error was harmless.
5. Leach is Entitled to Recover His Attorneys' Fees Incurred
on This Appeal.
The Leach Note provided for the payment of attorneys' fees to
Leach in the event of default.

Accordingly, Leach is entitled to
11

recover his attorneys' fees incurred on this appeal should the
Judgment be affirmed.

The case should be remanded to the district

court for a determination of the amount of fees to be awarded on
the appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that
the Judgment in favor of Leach should be affirmed, that Leach
should be awarded his attorneys1 fees incurred on this appeal and
that the case should be remanded for a determination of the amount
of fees to be awarded.
DATED this ^>U~-day of January, 1989.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

STEPHE^^B). MITCHELL
Attorneys for Respondent
Bud Leach
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